Book Reviews by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 1 Article 6 
1950 
Book Reviews 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Book Reviews, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 117 (1950). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol19/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
BOOK REVIEWS
CoURTs ON TRL, Myth and Reality in Avwricart Justice. By Jerome Frank.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. x, 441. $5.00.
Lawyers' "myths" picture our trial courts as doing what, in reality, they cannot
do and are not doing. Certainty, as far as they are concerned, is an illusion because
their "fact-finding" methods pile up "subjectivity upon subjectivity". Judge Frank
proposes to tell the "facts of life" and not the profession's "stork story" about the
birth of trial court decisions. The "stork story" may be represented by the formula
"R x F = D", "R" being the "rules of law", "F", the "facts as found"&, and "D",
the "decision" born of the happy union of "R" and "F". Thus is the illusion of
certainty created. According to Judge Frank the formula is really "R x SF - D",
for "F" is inevitably "SF"--subjective fact-for witnesses may lie or be mistaken,
the poverty of a party may prevent him from securing vital evidence, judges may
doze, and jurymen go wool-gathering. Moreover, it is but "legal magic" to talk
about "legal rights" until a court decision has authenticated them as such in a
particular case. Reforms may reduce but cannot eliminate the subjective factor.
What we need then is a new approach to judicial administration, aided by the
psychoanalyst, the psychiatrist and the anthropologist. We should welcome "indi-
vidualization" of decisions. Such are the "high-lights" of Courts On Trial. The
"words" are different, but the philosophical (epistemological) "music" is the "music",
of Judge Frank's earlier Law and the Modern Mind,1 with perhaps a more subdued
Freudian obligato.
To this reviewer it seemed that from the standpoint of the author's purposes,
the formula "R x SF = D" is no less an oversimplification than "R x F = D".
What trial lawyer taking a client into a negligence suit, for instance, would naively
guarantee the result on the basis of "R x F = D"? On the other hand, are we
merely indulging in "stork stories" when we warn a would-be testator about the
statutory consequences-say of a will devising or bequeathing more than half his
estate to charity? Again, are we but purveyors of "legal magic" if we do not
expressly warn the testator that the subscribing witnesses may perjure themselves
at probate and that the will may thus fail? Judge Frank's broad thesis "trusted
home" to its logical consequences makes what we are coming to call "Preventive"
Law silly affectation, and the current campaign of the bar advising laymen to "See
Your Lawyer First" becomes somewhat fatuous.
Taking the formula "R x SF = D" as more realistically describing the trial court
judicial process, Judge Frank makes suggestions for controlling the SF factor.
They are not, on the whole, either new or startling, ranging as they do from a more
general use of special verdicts and reforming the exclusionary rules of evidence,
to providing for juror education in the schools. Judge Frank is against the retention
of the jury system in Courts on Trial, and favors the ultimate substitution of
judges as fact-finders. 2 He admits that his "improvements" in the jury system of
1. Fs-pm, LAW Awn THE MoDR. TM=nm (6th ed. 194S).
2. But ef. Judge Frank's opinion in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946),
where the court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for defendant in an action
for damages for alleged infringement of copyright. Judge Frank said, "Surely then we
have an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine. Indeed even if there
were to be a trial before a judge, it would be desirable (although not necesary) for
him to summon an advisory jury on this question."
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fact-finding will not eliminate the SF factor entirely and that the same SF factor
will remain 'even after the jury goes and the judge takes its place. As for the
judges he makes other suggestions, including a proposal to have them carefully
psychoanalyzed. This would help, he thinks, to straighten out some of their psychic
kinks. But that "ol' debbil" SF will still be there. You can't escape it.
At this point, the author develops perhaps the most interesting portion of Courts
on Trial. He sketches a new kind of judicial process, indeed a new type of judicial
administration. He is influenced apparently by the alleged success 1 of adminis-
trative agencies in "fact-finding", and finds comfort in the present Supreme Court's
more or less open acknowledgment that it acts as a political agency in passing on
the constitutionality of laws.3  More significant, however, than the proposals
specifically made is the philosophy of law underlying them. The favorite theme that
"Certainty in Law" (Judge Frank's bete noire) is illusory, reappears. Primitive
Man, we are told (via the anthropologists) feared the "chanciness' of life. His
wizards with magic formulae sought to calm such terrors and create the illusion
that "chanciness" had been overcome. Religion later took over such "magic". (The
complacence of the author with regard to the "conclusions" and "fact-finding" of
the anthropologists, the psychiatrists, et al., is in sharp contrast to his skepticism
with regard to the fact-finding methods of the courts.) Today we should be
civilized enough to raise above the demand for "certainty" and to cast out that
legal "magic" which deludes us into the belief that we get it, or the hope that we
can get it, in the trial courts.
The relativism and subjectivism of Justice Holmes who is for Judge Frank the
"completely adult jurist"4 cast their long shadows over Courts Olt Trial. Holmes
had said that "to have doubted one's first principles is the mark of a civilized man",
and Judge Frank had agreed and applauded in Law and the Modern Mind.5 Yet
cannot it be that one needs first principles even before he can doubt? Readers of
Courts on Trial will then find interesting the epistemological implications of
Judge Frank's point that witnesses can never testify to facts but only to what they
believe were the facts.6 Such a view posits a whole philosophy. Is Truth itself
objective? Does the mind never know Reality but only its own processes? Courts
on Trial then is no mere limited study of trial courts. It is instinct with a philo-
sophical system. Shall "reform" of the judicial process come in the name of that
system? This is the most important question for readers of Courts on Trial.
Again we find much talk of the "sub-conscious" and the "conscious", but little
of "conscience". The author says be will avoid using lawyer's "jargon". He shows
no similar reluctance about the use of the "jargon" of the psychiatrist and the
psychoanalyst. Their "magic" is apparently potent enough to charm the submerged
prejudices and the "sub-conscious" "drives" of the judges. One may still innocently
wonder at the "magic" which leaps the gap between the consciousness and the
"sub-conscious". How shall consciousness give valid testimony of the "sub-conscious"
which, by definition, lies beneath it?
And thus does judicial administration get its "new look". Decisions should be
frankly recognized for what they are and should be--"individualization" of cases.
3. P. 311. (This reviewer wonders how the concept of the Supreme Court as a
"political agency" squares with democratic theory under which laws are to be made
by elected representatives of the people).
4. FRANY, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 253 (6th ed. 1948).
5. Id. at 257, 260.
6. P. 22.
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All that impedes this should be cast out, including the "fetishism ' of "stare decisis"
and transcendentalist nonsense that law is a body of principles and rules lying
beyond this or that judge.1 It is not surprising then to find Judge Frank con-
tinuing his assault on the "Cult of the Robe". "Robe-ism" is part of the legal
mumbo-jumbo which obscures the essential subjectivity of the judicial process and
retards the new dispensation wherein "individualization" of justice will be recog-
nized. Judges are "neither gods, nor devils, but men". Draping them in black
robes conceals this fact.
The quarrel over the judicial robe might seem a tempest in a teapot did it not
serve to poiht up the philosophy of law implicit in Courts on Trial. Some un-
regenerate readers may still think that the robe is more than a few yards of silk or
serge, that it is a symbolic pledge of the pursuit of a long cherished ideal. Seven
centuries ago Bracton wrote that the King himself was a "sub Dco et Lege". The
Kings are gone. The judges remain. Shall they not also be "under God and the
Law"? We live also by ideals we shall never see or touch. The symbols we see
and touch are the pledges that the ideals still have value and are still to be pursued.
How wisely has the Ancient Mother Church provided by innumerable symbols,
tangible pledges of that "world intangible" to which she leads her weak and erring
children! In the contest between the sponsors of law as "individualized" justice
and the defenders of law as a body of principles, whether the latter express their
concept in Bracton's "sub Deo et Lege" or in John Adams' "government of laws and
not of men", the attack of Judge Frank on the robe, itself symbolically marks out
the true battleground.
Limitations of space allow only bare mention of the author's criticism of Ameri-
can legal education. He thinks it is "unrealistic" because it continues too ex-
clusively the "casebook" system deriving from Harvard's Langdell-a "neurotic es-
capist"--to use Judge Frank's characterization of him. Greater attention to stu-
dent observation of actual court trials is recommended. "Moot" courts are at
best "faked". They are a poor substitute, often providing merely amusement or
relief from tedium.8
The "Natural Law" gets a rather confusing chapter in Courts on Trial. Ap-
parently the author intended to show that "Natural Law" has little, if any, value
in securing "certainty" in trial court decisions. He has, however, gone on to discuss
"Natural Law" generally. The results are not too happy. Does the author think
that the "Natural Law" doctrine is peculiarly a Roman Catholic possession? Again,
without citing the source, he quotes Chroust as saying that Natural Law has "at
different times, assumed and relinquished every and any philosophic standpoint".
Judge Frank quotes Father Lucey (again without citing the source, and vith text
omissions) saying that "What is morally good today may be morally bad tomorrow
and vice versa, because, while the few basic principles of morals do not change,
others do . . . . (the omissions are Judge Frank's). Countless human actions are
neither good nor bad in themselves" but "get their goodness or badness from cir-
cumstances of time, place, object and intent". This, says Judge Frank "sounds
7. Cf. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, 5 Form. L.
Ray. 272 (1936).
8. This reviewers experiences as a Faculty Assistant in "moot courts" at Fordham
Law School and at Notre Dame Law School have convinced him that the "moots" have
not served merely the purposes of "amusement" or "relief from tedium". At Notre Dame,
no student is graduated without at least ten hours attendance per semester for four
semesters in the trial courts of St. Joseph County.
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surprisingly like Pragmatism". Indeed he goes on to quote Brendan Brown as ad-
vocating the teaching of "Scholastic Pragmatism". The inferences drawn from
these quotations out of context seem questionable. They need further development.
Is the reader to conclude that Chroust is denying the objective validity of the
Natural Law doctrine, that Father Lucey is suggesting, for instance that Euthan-
asia may be in accord with the Natural Law at one time but not at another, or that
Brown surrenders Scholasticism to Pragmatism?
The "Natural Law" as expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas and applauded by
Judge Frank in Law and the Modern Mind9 is certainly not a parochial posses-
sion of Roman Catholicism. Aquinas offered it as the birthright of all men every-
where precisely in their character as creatures of a Divine Creator and endowed
by Him with an immortal soul, an intellect and a free will. God, acting with
Supreme Intelligence, made man and the world he inhabits in accordance with a
Divine Plan. The Plan is the "Eternal Law". Man participates in it through his
reason, i.e. he can, by his own reason, discover the primary dictates of the Eternal
Law and the inferences derivable from them. The Natural Law then is no more
a private possession of Catholics than is the Declaration of Independence which
embodies its main teachings. The Natural Law must be the ultimate test of the
validity of the. laws men make for men in organized society.10
The reviewer cannot follow Judge Frank in his attack on the Natural Law on
the ground that "Nature is no copybook containing precepts for civilized man.
Nor is human nature, unartificialized, a sound foundation for a beneficent social
structure", because "millions of Nazis recently disclosed what human nature can be"I
Might it not be suggested that it was precisely because the Nazis violated Natural
Law that the Nuremberg prosecution, when the "rotten parchment bonds" of Inter.
national Positive Law proved but broken reeds as the basis of the indictment, was
driven to rely on the Natural Law, at least implicitly-the Natural Law upon which
Suarez and Grotius had built the foundations of what little the civilized world
might call "International Positive Law" in 1945? It was either the "Natural Law"
or the "individualized"- perhaps "personalized" justice of the victors which spoke
at Nuremberg. The dilemma is not without embarrassment to Legal Positivists.11
Courts on Trial is an important book. It is a "must" for lawyers, judges, and in
fact for all who are concerned with the kind of basic philosophy which should direct
present and future legal reform. It draws sharply and deeply the lines on which
apparently the greatest intellectual combat in the field of jurisprudence since the
Common Law lawyers successfully resisted the "reception" of the Civil Law, is
to be fought. We owe to Judge Frank a debt of gratitude for the clarity, vigor
and courage with which he has stated the position of at least one of the parties to
that combat. Those who think the position unsound and dangerous should not
hesitate to join issue. Surely no one would welcome this more than the author of
Courts on Trial. EDWARD F. BARRETTf
9. FRA x, LAW AND IKE MODERN M3ID XVII (6th ed. 1948), where Judge Frank
declared, "I cannot -understand how any decent man can today refuse to adopt, as
the basis of modem civilization the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative
to human conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas."
10. The reviewer asks pardon for this excursus on the Natural Law. It seems neces-
sary in view of Judge Frank's general discussion of the subject.
11. Book Review, 16 FoRD. L. REv. 301 (1947).
t Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame University College of Law.
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Tim AssEsSnG oF SALVAGE AWAnnS. By Charles T. Sutton. London: Stevens
& Sons Limited, 1949. Pp. 757.
The ever-recurring occasions of the rescue of lives and property endangered upon
the high seas furnish one of the most romantic chapters of man's daring and
courage, often woven into the world's great literature. In addition to the romance
of the subject, however, the great sea-going nations, for centuries, have recognized
that such services should receive acknowledgment in the form of pecuniary revards,
and maritime law has developed certain principles, peculiar to it, administered by
Admiralty Courts, relating to "Salvage" and "Salvage Awards." In the law of sal-
vage there are two basic principles (among others) that (a) salvage awards are
payable out of the value of the salvaged property and (b), that the awards must
be fair to both the salvors and the owners of the salvaged property. So, within
the limit of the value of the property saved, an award, as far as possible, should
be an appropriate acknowledgment of the successful efforts of the salvors, en-
couraging mariners to the utmost exertion and promptness in rendering services;
and, at the same time, the award should leave a reasonable benefit of the salvage
to the owners of the property saved.'
To comply with those basic principles, the assessing of an award necessitates
proper consideration of numerous factors involved, such as the type and seriousness
of the peril from which the property is saved, the character and extent of the
hazards confronting the salvors and their equipment, the arduousness and length
of time of the salvage services, etc. As the relative importance of those factors
varies in practically every salvage service, it is impossible to assess a fair award
by a rule of thumb or some fixed percentage of the value of the salvaged property.
Yet, it is equally obvious that a wide disparity between high and low extremes of
salvage awards would result in unfairness.
An English author, Charles T. Sutton has developed convincingly, by his thorough
study of the salvage awards assessed by experienced English Admiralty judges in
upwards of 500 cases between 1919 and 1939, his thesis that those awards, although
assessed upon the variable circumstances and merits of each case, disclose a broad
consistency in the relative importance given to the principal factors in all types
of salvage services, with due allowance for the factual variations. After carefully
identifying the factors which are most commonly found in all salvage services,
Sutton has grouped them in three main divisions, and has worked out an em-
pirical formula, by which their relative values can be scaled, or measured, with
approximate accuracy, despite variations in the surrounding circumstances of each
case. He proves his thesis by showing that the application of his formula to the
known circumstances and the value of the salvaged property in each of the English
salvage cases decided in the 20-year period results in a figure closely approximating
the award which the Court granted.
After his intensive study had disclosed the broad consistency of the English
awards, Sutton was confronted with the problem of finding a mathematical ex-
pression of a formula which would adequately evaluate the basic factors, despite
1. Humanity demands that no price be placed upon the saving of life payable by the
persons saved, and there are no salvage awards, in the strict sense, for the saving of
lives when there is no saving of property. A statute of the United States, 37 STAT. 242
(1912), 46 U. S. C. § 729 (1946), provides that, under certain conditions, salvors of life,
acting concurrently with salvors of property, may receive a fair share of the remuneration
awarded to the latter.
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the varying circumstances, of each salvage service; and perhaps the most unique
phase of his work is his development of what may be described as a sliding scale,
which, with minor adjustments which are understandable and can be easily made,
permits the-use of the formula, in all types of salvage services, in reaching an ap-
proximately accurate estimate of a reasonable award. Sutton carries that test
of his formula through a long list of salvages of vessels in danger of sinking, vessels
on fire, vessels aground, vessels disabled by damage to or loss of machinery or
equipment, vessels which have been abandoned, and vessels which are in danger
of drifting into disaster through loss of their anchors. He also demonstrates that
the formula, with minor adjustments, can be applied in cases where there have
been two or more sets of salvors who should be reasonably compensated without
unreasonably increasing the total award payable out of the salvaged property.
Sutton frankly admits that, as the assessing of an award which will reflect reason-
ably the particular circumstances and merits of a salvage service lies solely in the
sound discretion of the Admiralty Court, no exact or absolute result can ever be
reached by some mathematical formula. He points out that it would be inappropri-
ate and misleading to suggest that theoretical resolution be substituted for intuitive
balance of judgment, which, so long as it continues' to be "balanced", needs no
substitute. Nevertheless, the formula which he has developed, reflecting the broad
consistency, "balance", in the decisions and awards of the highly experienced Eng-
lish Admiralty judges, should be very helpful to anyone called upon to determine,
approximately, a reasonable award for any new salvage service. This book will be
all the more welcome to anyone interested in the subject, because other standard
works on "Salvage", (at least here and in England) such as Kennedy's well-known
Treatise,2 have heretofore dealt almost solely with the principles of maritime law
under which salvage awards may be claimed and granted, without offering any
practical guide to the determination of a reasonable award.
In more recent years, when parties have been unable to agree upon a salvage
award, the practice has grown to submit the matter to arbitration, and suits for
salvage before the Admiralty Courts, here and in other countries, have become more
infrequent. If court practice in salvage cases continues to diminish, arbitrators, and
Admiralty judges themselves, may lose familiarity with the background of court
decisions to such extent that salvage awards will no longer represent "balanced
judgments." We are, perhaps, nearing that possibility in this country now. In the
last 25 years few, if any, of the men appointed to the bench of our Federal District
Courts have had any previous acquaintance with Admiralty or the background of
historical and technical reasons underlying the principles on which the maritime
law has developed; and, when called upon to sit in Admiralty in judgment upon
a suit for salvage award, they are understandably ill-equipped to assess the award
with "balanced judgment" reflecting that "broad consistency" which, as Sutton
argues, must continue if salvage awards are to be assessed fairly in the interests of
all parties concerned. If a salvage award today is two or three times larger than the
award in a closely comparable case yesterday, the salvors in the earlier case and
the owners of the salvaged property in the later case may rightly feel that they
have been dealt with unjustly.
Sutton writes with a literary style which makes for clarity and enjoyment in the
reading. He is, and has been for years, an executive of a British corporation which
owns and operates a large fleet of merchant vessels. His ability to carry on the
heavy burden of his business engagements, and, at the same time, make the ex-
2. KENNEDY, A TREATiSE OF = LAW OF CIVIL SAL vAGE (2d ed. 1907).
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tended and intensive study of details and statistics which was obviously necessary
for this book, stirs both astonishment and admiration.
Until a comparable study is made of the salvage awards of our Admiralty Courts,
it may perhaps remain uncertain whether Sutton's formula can be applied as closely
here as in England. But the probability is that the awards of the Admiralty Courts
of the United States, when analyzed, particularly in cases throughout the 19th
Century, will disclose that same "broad consistency" on which Sutton's formula
has been fashioned, because our Courts, from their beginning, have not hesitated
to look to the much older Admiralty Courts of England for guidance in a field of
law which is practically international in its general principles. In any event, Sutton's
book is a veritable mine of information which furnishes valuable guidance to the
assessing of reasonable salvage awards, and the book should come to be accepted
as a standard work on the subject with which it deals.
ROBERT S. Ensxnr4
Member of the New York Bar.

